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Summary findings
Queisser examines the performance of the new private  Private pension funds in Peru have become
pension systems in Peru and Colombia during their first  increasingly diversified, with 25 percent of assets
years of existence.  invested in equities by the end of 1996. But a big share
Peru and Colombia were the second and third Latin  of investments is in the banking sector and other
American countries to implement a systemic reform of  financial institutions, giving the funds significant
their pension systems. The reforms experienced  exposure to a sector that in most countries is highly
difficulties in both countries, partly because of  leveraged and exposed to financial crises. Those
deficiencies in the design of the new systems and partly  investments should be more diversified sectorally.
because of shortcomings in implementation.  Development of Colombia's private pension system
Both countries, but especially Peru, took several  was also limited because it coexisted with the public
additional measures to rectify the design problems of  system. Competition with the public system was not as
their reform programs. The systems now in place differ  unfair as in Peru, but the slow pace of reform in the
in several important respects from the systems initially  public system and the disincentives for older workers  to
introduced.  join the new system were a significant obstacle to faster
This shared experience suggests that, although flawed  growth.
reform programs incur inefficiencies, the flaws can be  Despite using a preexisting fund management
removed and the reform programs significantly  infrastructure,  Colombia's private pensions funds
strengthened - if the authorities have a strong long-term  incurred high start-up costs and suffered heavy losses.
commitment to a successful systemic pension reform.  Although Colombia's financial sector was far more
Peru's private pension funds suffered unfair  developed than Peru's when reform started, Colombia's
competition with its public pillars, which required lower  portfolio  has been much slower to diversify than Peru's
contribution rates and lower retirement ages. They  - mostly because of high returns on fixed-income
suffered poor  financial results partly because of low  securities in Colombia and low trading in the stock
salary levels and partly because they were not given  market.
permission to defer their high start-up costs, resulting in  Queisser discusses the public pension systems only in
substantial capital losses.  terms of their relationship with and impact on the
private systems' functioning.
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disclaimer applies.I.  INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY  OF FINDINGS
This paper examines the performance  of the new private pension systems in Peru and
Colombia  during  the first years of their existence.  While the  public pension  systems  in these countries
have many important economic implications,  particularly with respect to the government's fiscal
policy, they will only be discussed in their relation and impact on the functioning of the private
systems.  The first section  of this paper  introduces  the main features  of the private pension systems  in
Peru and Colombia  and briefly summarizes  the main findings.  The structure  and performance  of the
systems  are discussed  in detail in Section  II for Peru and Section  III for Colombia.
Table 1
Overview:  The Private  Pension  Systems  in Peru and Colombia
Peru  Colombia
Start  June 1993  April 1994
Number  of AFPs  5  9
Affiliates  (end 96)  1.55  million  2.1 million
Coverage  (% of  18%  18%
labor force)
Total contribution  11%  13.5%
rate
Income  ceiling  no ceiling  20 minimum  wages
Retirement  age  65 years  62/57  years
Supervision  AFP Superintendency  Pension  Department  of
Bank Superintendency
Funds per AFP  1  3
Recognition  bonds  0% real interest  3-4% real interest
Transfer  between  Not allowed  Allowed
public  and private
systems
Funds (end  96)  US$ 1 billion (1.5%GDP)  US$ 820 million  (1% GDP)
Tax treatment  Contributions  not deductible  Contributions  and benefits
Benefits  taxed  tax-deductible
Minimum  rate of  abolished,  new regulation  pending  Composite  of industry
return  average  and index
Minimum  pension  no minimum  pension,  equal  to one minimum  wage
regulation  pending
1Peru and Colombia were respectively the second and third Latin American countries to
implement a systemic reform of their pension systems.  The reforms experienced difficulties in both
countries, partly because of deficiencies in the design of the new systems and partly because of
shortcomings in implementation.  Both countries, but especially Peru, took several additional
measures to rectify the design problems of their reform programs.  The systems that are now in place
differ in several important respects from the systems that were initially introduced.  This shared
experience suggests that, although flawed reform programs incur inefficiencies, the flaws can be
removed and the reform programs significantly strengthened if the authorities have a strong long-
term commitment to a successful systemic pension reform.
PERU
The Peruvian pension reform was launched in June 1993 on the basis of Law 25897 of 1992.
A new defined-contribution pension scheme  (SPP), decentralized and managed by private  pension
fund management companies (AFPs), was introduced as an alternative to the existing defined-benefit
"pay-as-you-go" system (SNP). Contrary to the Chilean pension reform, which is phasing out the old
public system, the Peruvian reform involves the continuing coexistence of two pension systems.  As
in  Chile, workers switching  to the private pillar were entitled  to recognition bonds  for their  past
contributions to the public pillar.
The impact of the Peruvian reform was constrained by three main factors: imposing a higher
contribution rate and higher retirement ages on workers joining the private pillar; failing to allow the
transfer of public employees, who were covered by "Cedula Viva" (CV), a generous and expensive
defined benefit system; and permitting new entrants to the labor force to join the public pillar.
The  Peruvian  authorities  took  several measures  on  successive  occasions  to  redress  the
balance and  improve the prospects  of the private pillar.  Thus,  in July  1995 they  eliminated  the
difference in contribution rates and retirement ages (Law 26504).  A year later, in July 1996, they
allowed public employees to transfer from the CV to the SPP and even provided incentives for such
transfers, while establishing a reserve fund (Fondo Consolidado de Reservas Previsionales, financed
from privatization proceeds) to cover the liabilities of the public pillar (Legislative Decree 817).
Further measures were taken in November 1996 to encourage switching to the private pillar
(Legislative  Decree  874).  The  eligibility  criteria  to  apply  for  a  recognition  bond  were  eased
significantly, while changes in regulations were implemented that aimed at discouraging  high fees
and stimulating competition (World Bank 1996).  LD 817 eliminated the use of a benchmark rate of
return for the sector and of the "bands" around this rate of return, required  investment results to be
regularly reported on a net of fees basis and expanded the range of eligible investment instruments.
The decree also provided for a minimum profitability requirement to be specified by  an appropriate
regulation, but no such regulation has been issued yet.
Main Features
Many  of the features  of the private pension  system in Peru  are modeled  on  the  Chilean
prototype.  There  are, however,  some important  differences  from the  Chilean example  which  are
summarized below:
2*  There is no minimum  pension  guarantee  in Peru. Although  the law contemplates  the
possibility  of introducing  a minimum  benefit,  no such provisions  have been made to
date.
*  Mandatory and voluntary contributions to  the individual accounts are not tax-
deductible,  while  pension  benefits  are taxed.
*  There are no ceilings on mandatory pension contributions,  but the premiums for
disability  and survivors'  insurance  are subject  to a ceiling.
*  The recognition  bonds  carry  no real interest,  i.e. they are indexed  to prices  and earn a
zero real rate of interest.
*  There is a maximum  limit for recognition  of past contributions  to the old system.
*  New  workers  are not automatically  affiliated  in the new system.
*  There is a uniform  retirement  age of 65 years for men and women.
*  The benchmark rate of return and the "bands" around this have been eliminated,
although  the law provides  for an unspecified  minimum  profitability  requirement.
At the end of 1996,  about 1.55  million  workers  were affiliated  in the SPP representing  about
18 percent of the estimated  economically  active population,  while another 1 million workers  (about
12  percent of the economically  active  population)  were affiliated  with the public system.
The new pension system started up with 5 AFPs. By the end of 1993, 8 AFPs had been
established. All AFPs  are  joint ventures  with foreign  partners. Market  concentration  has increased  as
a result of mergers  and currently there are again 5 AFPs in the market. Out of the five AFPs, only
one has been able to break even. All the other companies  have been running high operating losses
due to high start-up  costs and expenses  for advertising  and sales.
The contribution rate to  the individual accounts, which is used for  long-term capital
accumulation,  is currently  8 percent of workers' salaries. The total funds under management  by the
AFP system amounted  to about US$ 1 billion at the end of 1996,  corresponding  to about 1.5  percent
of GDP.
The portfolios of  the AFPs, though exhibiting high uniformity, have been diversified
considerably  since  the start of the system. While most of the funds  were placed in bank deposits  in
the beginning,  already about  a quarter  of total assets were invested  in shares  by the end of 1996. The
average  real rate of return of the AFPs,  before deducting  operating  expenses  or commission  fees, has
been about 7 percent annually since the start of the system in 1993. The net real return to affiliates
was slightly  negative in the first two years but reached 4.5% in 1996 (Shah 1997). Over a worker's
full career the expected  net real rate of return  is likely to be highly  positive.
The number of pensioners in the Peruvian  private pension system is still small. By August
1996, only 134 old age pensioners, 85 disability  pensioners and 3,559 survivors were receiving
benefits.
Main Findings
*  The evolution  of the private pension  funds in Peru was seriously  affected  by the  "unfair"
competition  between the private and public pillars. Lower contribution  rates and lower
retirement ages for affiliates  of the public pillar greatly reduced the attractiveness  of the
private  pension funds.
3*  The AFPs  have suffered  from poor financial  results. AFP  revenues  have been lower than
in Argentina  and Chile due to the lower salary levels of affiliates. Peruvian  AFPs have
not been given the permission  to defer start-up  costs, which has resulted in substantial
losses  of the AFP's capital.
*  In Peru, a continuous  diversification  of the pension  funds' portfolio  can be observed.  The
percentage  of assets invested  in equities has been growing  particularly fast and reached
more  than 25 percent  by the end of 1996.
*  Despite increasing  diversification  of instruments,  the AFPs' portfolios  continue  to have a
high share of investments  in the banking sector and other financial institutions.  This
represents significant  exposure to an economic sector that is in most countries highly
leveraged and exposed to the adverse effects of financial crises.  A more balanced
sectoral  diversification  of investments  would  be desirable.
COLOMBIA
In  April  1994, Colombia introduced a new privately managed pension scheme as  an
alternative  to its existing  public  pension system.  Like in the case  of Peru, affiliation  in the new system
is not mandatory  but depends  on the choice  of each individual  worker.
Main Features
The private pension system  has many of the features  of the Chilean  system.  As in Peru, it has
been modified  in several  areas  to take account  of the characteristics  of the Colombian  financial  sector
and the existing  institutional  structure  of social  protection.
The most important  differences  from the Chilean  model  are:
*  Workers  are allowed  to switch  every  3 years between  the public and private systems.
*  New labor  force entrants  are  not required  to join the private system.
*  Subsidies, financed through an  additional percentage point  of  contributions and
government  transfers, are provided  to enable low income groups to join either pension
system.
*  The contribution  rate is payable  by employers  (75 percent)  and employees  (25 percent).
*  AFPs are allowed  to operate  more than  one fund.
*  Workers  are allowed  to have more  than one account.
*  The regulations  on ownership  of AFPs  are more  relaxed.
*  There is no separate  independent  supervisory  agency  for pensions.  The pension funds are
supervised  by the Pension  Department  of the Bank Superintendency.
*  A variety of AFP fees is permitted,  including  fee differentiation  between  affiliates. AFPs
have so far applied fees per collection  but not on assets.
*  Fees are capped at 3.5 percent of workers' salaries and AFPs are required to report
returns net of commissions.
*  The retirement  ages are  57 years for women and 62 years for men.
Affiliation  in the private system stood at about  2.1 million in December 1996, corresponding
to 18  percent of the economically  active population. About 2.6 million workers  are affiliated in the
4other pension schemes  of the public system, which would correspond  to an additional  22 percent of
the economically  active population;  this number is a rough estimate,  however, since the files of the
public system have not been revised and cleaned  and the errors in the registers  are considered  to be
substantial.
The private pension system  in Colombia  used the pre-existing  structure  of privately  managed
severance  funds as a basis. When  the new pension system started  in April 1994,  8 of the 10 existing
severance  fund management  companies  were licensed  to manage  pension funds. In December  of the
same year, an additional  company  was licensed  to manage  only pension funds. At the end of  1996,
there were 8 companies managing both pension and severance funds, 1 company managing only
pension funds and 1 company  managing only severance funds. To date, there has been only one
merger in the Colombian pension system.  The Colombian private pension system is far less
concentrated  than the Peruvian  system.
At the end of 1996,  the funds  under management  of the mandatory  pension system  amounted
to about US$823 million (approximately  1 percent of GDP). Voluntary  pension funds had assets of
an additional  US$69 million. The mandatory severance  funds had accumulated  US$680 million or
about 0.7% of GDP.  Total assets administered  by the pension and severance fund management
companies  thus corresponded  to about 1.7  percent of GDP.
The contribution  rate to the individual  pension  accounts  was initially set at 8 percent in 1994.
It was increased, as originally planned, to  9 percent in  1995 and to  10 percent in  1996. The
investment  regulations are much more relaxed in Colombia  than in Chile and Peru, yet the portfolio
of the Colombian  AFPs has been diversified  only slowly over the past years. In their investment
strategy,  the AFPs have consistently  shown  a strong preference  for fixed income  securities  and there
is a strong emphasis  on bonds,  particularly  those issued by financial  institutions  as well as by quasi-
public entities.
In real terms, the gross rates of return of the mandatory pension funds were 14.4 percent
during May-December  1994,  i.e. during  the first nine months  of the system, 15.9  percent in 1995,  and
15  percent in 1996.
Main Findings
*  As in the case of Peru, the growth of the Colombian  private pension system was limited
because of the co-existence  with the public system.  The competition  with the public
system  was not as "unfair"  in terms of contribution  rates and eligibility  conditions  as was
initially in Peru, but the slow pace of reform in the public system and the disincentives
for older workers to join the new system did present a significant  obstacle to faster
growth.
*  The ability of the private pension system to generate long-term savings and mobilize
domestic  resources  has been limited  by the low level of income in Colombia. More than
75 percent of affiliates  to the private system  earn less than 2 minimum  salaries.
*  The financial  condition  of the AFPs  has also been  negatively  affected  by the low incomes
of the affiliated workers.  Since the fees are charged as a percentage of salaries, the
operating  revenues  of the AFPs  have also been low. So far, none of the AFPs  has broken
even.
5*  Despite using an existing fund management infrastructure,  the start-up costs of the
private system  were still very high. Expenses  for advertising  and marketing  resulted in
losses  of almost  70 percent  of the AFPs' capital  compared  to about  66 percent in Peru.
*  Although the financial sector in Colombia was far more developed at the moment of
reform,  the diversification  of the AFPs' portfolios  has been much slower than in Peru.
This is probably  due to the high returns on fixed  income securities  in Colombia  and to the
low trading  volumes  on the stock market  as a share of GDP.
6II.  STRUCTURE  AND PERFORMANCE  OF THE PRIVATE
PENSION  SYSTEM IN PERU
The Peruvian pension reform was launched in June 1993 on the basis of Law 25897 of 1992.
A new defined-contribution pension scheme (SPP), decentralized and managed by  private pension
fund management companies (AFPs), was introduced as an alternative to the existing defined-benefit
"pay-as-you-go"  system (SNP).  Contrary to the Chilean pension reform, which is phasing out the old
public system, the Peruvian reform involves the continuing coexistence of two pension systems.  As
in  Chile, workers  switching  to the private pillar were entitled  to recognition bonds  for their past
contributions to the public pillar.
The impact of the Peruvian reform was constrained by three main factors: imposing a higher
contribution rate and higher retirement ages on workers joining the private pillar; failing to allow the
transfer of public employees, who were covered by "Cedula Viva" (CV), a generous and expensive
defined benefit system; and permitting new entrants to the labor force to join the public pillar.
The  Peruvian  authorities  took  several measures  on  successive  occasions  to  redress  the
balance  and  improve the prospects  of the private pillar.  Thus,  in July  1995 they  eliminated  the
difference in contribution rates and retirement ages (Law 26504).  A year later, in July 1996, they
allowed public employees to transfer from the CV to the SPP and even provided incentives for such
transfers, while establishing a reserve fund (Fondo Consolidado de Reservas Previsionales, financed
from privatization proceeds) to cover the liabilities of the public pillar (Legislative Decree 817).
Further measures were taken in November  1996 to encourage switching to the private pillar
(Legislative  Decree  874).  The  eligibility  criteria  to  apply  for  a  recognition  bond  were  eased
significantly, while changes in regulations  were implemented that aimed at discouraging  high fees
and stimulating competition (World Bank 1996).  LD 817 eliminated the use of a benchmark rate of
return for the sector and of the "bands" around this rate of return, required investment results to be
regularly reported on a net of fees basis  and expanded the range of eligible investment instruments.
The decree also provided for a minimum profitability requirement to be specified by an appropriate
regulation, but no such regulation has been issued yet.
Many  of the  features of  the private pension  system in Peru  are modeled  on  the Chilean
prototype.  There  are, however,  some important  differences  from the  Chilean example which  are
summarized below:
*  There is no minimum pension guarantee in Peru. Although the law contemplates the
possibility of introducing a minimum benefit, no such provisions have been made to
date.
*  Mandatory  and  voluntary  contributions  to  the  individual  accounts  are  not  tax-
deductible, while pension benefits are taxed.
*  There  are no  ceilings on  mandatory  pension contributions,  but  the premiums  for
disability and survivors' insurance are subject to a ceiling.
*  The recognition bonds carry no real interest, i.e. they are indexed to prices and earn a
zero real rate of interest.
*  There is a maximum limit for recognition of past contributions to the old system.
*  New workers are not automatically affiliated in the new system.
7*  There is a uniform retirement age of 65 years for men and women.
*  The benchmark rate  of return and the "bands"  around this  have been  eliminated,
although the law provides for an unspecified minimum profitability requirement.
Coverage
In Peru, coverage in either the public pension system (SNP) or in the private pension system
(SPP) is  mandatory  for  all  dependent workers.  Independent workers  may  voluntarily join  either
system.  At introduction of the SPP in June 1993, all workers already affiliated with the SNP were
given the choice of switching to the SPP or remaining in the public system.  This option does not
expire and transfers from the SNP to the SPP are possible at any time.
New entrants to the labor force have to decide whether to join the SPP or the SNP within a
period of 10 days.  If the worker does not make this choice, the employer will automatically affiliate
the worker in the private  system.  Until June  1996, switching back  from the private  to the public
system  was  allowed  for  women  and  men  who  were  older  than  50  and  55  years,  respectively.
Affiliates,  who had  wrongly  assumed  that they  would be  entitled  to a recognition  bond  for  past
contributions  to the  old system, were  also  allowed to  switch back  to  the  SNP.  The  number  of
affiliates who transferred back, however, was small.  By the end of 1995, only about 2,800 workers
had switched back to the SNP. The option of switching back was terminated in June 1996.
8Past contributions  to the old system are honored  by the government  through the issue of a
recognition  bond for workers  who have contributed  during the six months before the reform and for
at least 4 years during the last 10 years prior to 1992. The face value of the bond depends on the
years of contributions  made and the average salary during  the 12 months prior to December 1992.1
Previous contributions,  however, are recognized  only up to a ceiling.  This was originally set at
S.60,000;  due to adjustments  for inflation,  it now corresponds  to about  US$ 46,000. The recognition
bonds  are indexed  to prices  but carry  no real interest. In the amendment  to the pension law passed  in
November 1996, the requirements  to obtain a recognition  bond were loosened  to offer a greater
incentive  for affiliates  to switch to the new system. Now affiliates  only have to have contributed  for
4 years during  the last 10  years in order to qualify  for a recognition  bond.
Affiliation
At the end of 1996,  about 1.55  million workers  were affiliated  in the SPP representing  about
18 percent of the estimated  economically  active  population  and 47 percent of all dependent  workers.
An estimated 12 percent of the economically  active population are still affiliated with the public
system. If only the 3.2 million workers under the age of 45 are taken into account as potential
affiliates,  the SPP  affiliation  represents  a coverage  of about  45 percent.
The SPP has been attracting  predominantly  the younger workers. Almost 70 percent of all
SPP affiliates are below the age of 35 and only 4 percent are above  the age of 50 years; the average
age of all affiliates  is 32 years. Male workers  account  for 67 percent of all affiliates. The majority  of
affiliates are dependent workers; about one fifth are independent  workers. More than half of all
affiliates  live in the urban centers  of Lima and Callao.
The pace of affiliation  to the new private system  was high in the beginning  due to extensive
publicity campaigns  by the pension fund management  companies. In 1993, 63 percent of the SPP
affiliates were entitled  to recognition  bonds for their contributions  to the old system which indicates
that initially  the majority  of affiliates  to the new system  came from the SNP. But, as shown  in Graph
1, monthly affiliation declined  continuously  from more than 100,000  workers during the first three
months after the system was launched  in July 1993  to less than 5,000  workers  in June 1995.
The decline of affiliation was due to several  factors. First, the uneven competition  between
the SPP and the SNP resulted in disincentives  for workers  to join the SPP.  The contribution  rate
payable  by the worker to SNP  was only 3 percent compared  to 14  percent in the SPP whose  affiliates
were also required to pay an additional 1 percent "solidarity"  contribution  to the SNP.  Further, a
sales tax of 18 percent was levied on the AFP commissions  and insurance  premiums  payable  by SPP
affiliates. Workers  who switched  were given a  salary  increase  of about 13.5  percent to compensate
for the higher  rates in the SPP. However,  some private and public sector employers  had difficulties
paying this increase which effectively  resulted in a rise of labor costs because employers  had only
paid a 6 percent contribution  before.
Second, the retirement age in the SPP was 65 years for men and women while retirement
ages in the SNP were only 60 and 55 years for men and women,  respectively.
For a discussion  of the calculation  of recognition  bonds see Annex  3, World  Bank  (1996).
9Third,  implementation problems,  particularly  the  failure  of  the  government  to  issue  the
promised recognition bonds, reduced the confidence of workers in the new system.  The regulations
for the issue of recognition bonds did not come out until December 1994.
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Fourth, until April 1994, the government did not pay the contributions for those public sector
employees  who  had joined  the  SPP. The  still outstanding  debt,  including  interest  and  penalties,
amounts to about S.400 million or US$ 162  million.
Fifth, affiliates were not properly informed about the implications  of the  pension reform;
many workers thought, for example, that they would lose health insurance coverage if they switched
from the public to the private pension system.
After  contribution  rates  between  the  SPP and  SNP were  equalized  at  11 percent  and  a
uniform  retirement  age of  65  years  was set  for  both  systems  in  July  1995, monthly  affiliation
increased by a factor of 5.  In the last quarter of  1996, about 40,000 workers on average joined  the
SPP every month.  It should be noted that the July 1995 changes also removed the "solidarity"  fee of
1%  that affiliates to the private pillar were required to pay.
As observed in the case of Chile and other countries which operate AFP systems, there is a
large discrepancy between  the number  of affiliates and those who  actually regularly contribute  to
their  accounts.  In Peru,  the share of affiliates who are regularly contributing  to their accounts is
estimated to be around 45 percent.
There are various reasons for this discrepancy.  In the case of dependent workers, employers
may default on their payment obligations and mistakes are made in the contribution data submitted to
10the AFPs or in the payment of contributions. Some of the evasion is simply due to the fact that
workers leave the labor market to pursue further studies,  stay at home or start up their own business
in which case they are no longer  obliged to contribute. Independent  workers  often stop contributing
due to  the instability of their incomes, other priorities in  the allocation of  their savings, or
misunderstanding  of the benefits and mechanics  of the system. However,  as highlighted  by Vittas
(1997b),  what matters from the point of view of adequate  income in retirement  is the extent to which
household heads or breadwinners  have a full contribution  period.  As in the other Latin American
countries,  this is an issue  that merits further  study.
The SAFP conducted  a study (Aporte  7/ 1996)  of the contribution  pattern which showed  the
following results: (i)  irregular contributions were  much more frequent among independent,
voluntarily affiliated workers than among dependent workers; (ii) there was no difference in the
contribution  patterns of male and female  affiliates; (iii) the older the affiliates were, the higher the
density of their contributions;  (iv) there were regional  differences  in contribution  patterns with rural
areas showing  a lower density of contributions;  (v) there was a positive correlation  between income
and contributions; and (vi) affiliates who were entitled to  recognition bonds contributed more
regularly. These results, however, were based only on a small representative sample of affiliates
which  had been in the system from the start and therefore  should  be interpreted  cautiously.
Since the start of the new system, there have been two official programs to retire the
employers' debt to the system. These  programs  enable  AFPs  to negotiate  directly  with the employers
a scheduled  repayment  of the overdue  pension contributions. The program  applies a market interest
rate  of about 18 percent instead of the much higher rates normally charged on  outstanding
contributions.
Management Companies
The rules and regulations  to which the pension fund management  companies  are subject in
Peru are very similar to those applied in Chile.  Like in Chile, the Peruvian companies are called
Administradoras  de Fondos de Pensiones (AFPs).  These companies are not allowed to do any other
business  than pension fund management. They have to be set up as joint-stock companies. Banks,
insurance  companies,  and other  financial  institutions  that already  operate  in Peru as well as the public
social security institution  IPSS are prohibited from owning  AFPs. The holding  companies of such
banks and other financial  institutions,  however,  may invest  in AFPs.
The  AFPs  are  licensed,  regulated and  supervised by  a  specialized agency,  the
Superintendencia  de AFPs or SAFP. The SAFP is an autonomous  agency, its staff is subject to
employment  terms of the private sector  including  the payscale, and the superintendent  is nominated
by the President for a term of 5 years.  The agency is financed  through a fee levied on the AFPs in
relation to the size of the funds they administer. This fee started  out at 0.2 percent of assets and was
subsequently  reduced to 0.05 percent in 1996 and 0.00048  percent at the beginning  of 1997.  The
annual expenditure  of the supervisory  agency has amounted to about US$ 4-5 million; in  1994,
annual assessments  on the AFPs covered approximately  half of the costs while in 1995 they were
sufficient  to finance  practically  all the supervision  expenditure.
Each AFP is allowed to manage only one fund for all affiliates.  The retirement capital
managed by an AFP is an independent  entity, which is legally and financially separated from the
11companies'  capital  in  order to  ensure  that  members'  assets  are  protected  in  case  of  an  AFP's
bankruptcy.  The  assets  of  the pension  fund belong  exclusively  to  the  affiliates,  they  are  not
attachable,  and  are not  affected  by  any  financial  losses  suffered  by  the  AFP.  The  transaction
requirements and custodial arrangements are similar but a little less stringent than in Chile.  In Peru,
all transactions other than CD primary issues must be made through the securities exchange.  In Chile
in the beginning only the Central Bank was allowed to act as custodian for AFP transactions but now
private companies are authorized as well.  In Peru, any independent financial institution may perform
the role of custodian.
AFPs must have a minimum capital of S.500,000 or approximately US$200,000.  Further,
they must keep a mandatory investment reserve so that possible shortfalls arising from the minimum
profitability  guarantee can be compensated for.  This reserve (encaje) is equal to 0.7 percent of the
total fund under management plus an add-on depending on the risk-rating of the fund's  investments.
This  usually  results  in  a total  reserve  of about  1 percent  of assets  under  management,  which  is
equivalent to the encaje requirements  in Chile.  Until recently, the Peruvian system had  the same
regulations  on minimum profitability as the Chilean system.  But in Peru, this minimum  guarantee
was not backed by the government but had to be provided by the AFPs alone.  In the November  1996
amendment to the pension law, however, the benchmark rate of return based on the average return of
the  whole  sector  and  the  "bands"  around  this  return  were  eliminated.  . Although  a  minimum
profitability requirement has, in principle, been retained, it has not been specified yet.
Market  Concentration
The new pension system started up in June 1993 with 5 AFPs.  By the end of 1993, 8 AFPs
had been  established.  All AFPs are joint  ventures with foreign partners including Citibank, Aetna
International, ING, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the American International Group
(AIG)  and  Grupo Bansander.  The  Chilean AFPs  are  also  participating:  Santa Maria,  Provida,
Banmedica and Union are shareholders in  Peruvian AFPs.
Market  concentration  has  increased  as  a  result  of mergers.  The  first  merger  of  AFPs
occurred  in August  1994 between Horizonte  and Megafondo,  followed by  the merger of Nueva
Vida and Providencia in November 1994; Profuturo and El Roble merged in September 1996.
The three largest AFPs account for 76 percent of all affiliates and 74 percent of total funds.
The Herfindahl index of concentration is 2312 in the case of affiliates and 2295 in the case of funds
under management. The concentration of the Peruvian market is higher than the concentration of the
Chilean market when the AFP system was first launched in 1981 and the Herfindahl index was 2200
for funds under management; it has since fallen to 1260 in 1994 (Vittas 1997c). It is also higher than
in Argentina where the index was 1121 and 1158, respectively (Vittas 1997a).
The two largest AFPs, as measured by the number of affiliates, Profuturo  and Horizonte,
each took over smaller AFPs in 1994.  Both AFPs are majority owned by non-Peruvian shareholders;
foreign  investors  account for  61 percent  of Profuturo's  equity and  for 56  percent  in the  case  of
Horizonte.  In the largest AFP in terrns of assets managed, Integra, foreign shareholders account for
just over half of total equity with large stakes by Aetna and ING.
12Table  2
Market Concentration in the SPP (12/96)
Fund
AFP  Affiliates  %  (million  soles)  %
Profuturo  417,634  26.9  509.7  20.7
Horizonte  390,925  25.2  585.9  23.7
Integra  377,118  24.3  735.1  29.8
Union  284,084  18.3  479.9  19.4
Nueva  Vida  80,878  5.3  157.2  6.4
Total  1,550,639  100.0  2,467.8  100.0
Source:  SAFP,  December 1996
The evolution of the  sales force in the  SPP matches the  evolution of affiliation discussed
earlier.  At the outset of the new system, the AFPs had a salesforce of more than 3,000 agents which
rapidly increased to almost 6,000 in December 1993.  In the initial phase, AFPs competed intensely
for affiliates paying less attention to actual contributions and income levels of their affiliates.  Since
the number of workers switching over to the new system was considerably lower than the AFPs had
originally projected, marketing efforts were increased to attract more affiliates.  The advertisements,
however, were often confusing and unsuccessful in convincing workers of the benefits of the SPP.
As it became evident that affiliation rates were declining and the AFPs were running large
operational deficits, the number of agents was reduced.  As shown in Graph 2, the reduction of sales
personnel was gradual at first, as marketing strategies were revised, and then more rapid as the AFPs
started closing branches and drastically cutting their operational costs.  In December 1994, there were
less than 800 agents employed by the whole system.  The number of AFP branch offices was reduced
from 139 in December 1993 to 71 in December 1994.
Evolution  of  Sales  Personnel
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13Since July 1995, when the law was amended to create a level playing field for the SPP and
SNP and  the government started issuing recognition bonds,  the number  of agents has  increased
again, reaching about 4,300 in October 1996.  Transfers of affiliates between AFPs were not allowed
until November  1995.  Members  can now switch from one AFP to another after a minimum  of 6
consecutive months of contributions.  In order to switch, the affiliate has to go the AFPs'  offices and
sign transfer forms.  Further, a fixed fee of S.80 (about US$ 32) is charged per transfer payable to the
AFP the affiliate wishes to leave.  The number of affiliates switching AFPs is still fairly low.  By
December 1996, 68,638 affiliates had requested to switch; this corresponds to 4.4 percent of affiliates
and  almost  10 percent  of  contributors.  Transfers  are  likely to  increase  as AFPs  step  up  their
marketing and advertising efforts.  In Chile, about 50 percent of all contributors switched between
AFPs in 1996.
Financial Condition ofAFPs
The 8 APFs started out in 1993 with a capital of about US$ 30 million; approximately half of
the total equity was owned by foreigners.  Due to the high start-up and expansion costs, the total AFP
capital was increased to US$ 150 million by the end of 1996.  The AFPs with the most affiliates are
also the highest capitalized companies.  Horizonte has a capital of  S.75 million (US$ 30 million) and
Profuturo of  S.74 million. Integra, the AFP with the largest fund under management, however, has
a capital of only S. 28 million.
T'he AFPs adopted different strategies in their efforts to attract affiliates.  Both Profuturo
and  Horizonte  set  out from  the beginning  to  become  the  market  leaders  in terms  of  affiliates.
Integra,  the only AFP which has been able to break even, adopted a mass policy as well but focused
on high quality of services from the start. It now has the most assets under management as well as the
highest fund per affiliate.
As can be expected with a large share of high-income affiliates, Integra has the most regular
contribution pattern of all AFPs; while the system's  average ratio between contributors and affiliates
is only 45 percent, 56 percent of Integra's  affiliates contribute regularly to their accounts.  Nueva
Vida adopted a niche policy concentrating only on the higher income segment by charging very high
fixed but low variable commissions.  The dispersion of contributions collected per contributor is very
high; in August  1996, collection per contributor ranged between S.75.58 (Profuturo) and S.  149.41
(Nueva  Vida).
Initially, the AFPs were allowed to charge affiliates three different types of commissions for
the  administration  of pension  funds: (i) a monthly  fixed  commission per  affiliate;  (ii) a  monthly
variable commission calculated as a percentage of the pensionable salary; and (iii) a monthly variable
commission calculated as a percentage of the balances administered.  There is an additional fixed fee
of S. 80 payable by affiliates who wish to transfer their balances to another AFP.  Each AFP is free to
set these commissions; however, they are still required to charge the same fee to all of their affiliates
and discrimination, for example discounts to encourage affiliates to stay, are not permitted yet but the
law enables the Superintendencia to allow discounts in the future.
During  the  first year  of operations,  AFPs  charged  on  average  1.6 percent  of salaries  as
variable commission as well as a fixed commission of about 1 Sol per month.  In the second year of
operations, commissions were increased by 25 percent on average.  The commissions charged by the
14Peruvian AFPs are higher than those charged in Chile and about the same as those charged in
Argentina. In October  1996,  the average  fixed commission  in Peru amounted  to US$ 1.40,  compared
to US$ 0.40 in Chile and US$ 1.35 in Argentina. The average  variable commission  of 2.02 percent
and the average premium payable for disability  and survivors' insurance  added up to 3.25 percent,
however  subject  to a ceiling,  compared  to 2.97  percent in Chile and 3.3 percent  in Argentina.
Table  3
AFP Commissions  (October  1996/January  1997)
Horizonte  Profuturo  Integra  Union  Nueva
Vida
Fixed (soles)  2.54  2.95  2.54  2.54  5.51
Variable  (%)  2.03  2.03  2.03  2.03  1.99
(October  1996)
Variable  (%)  2.30  2.50  2.35  2.28  2.29
(January 1997)  J
Source:  SAFP
Since January 1997, the law allows only the variable commission as a  percentage of
contributions. Fixed fees on monthly  contributions  as well as variable  fees charged  on the balance  of
the affiliates have been disallowed. None of the AFPs had been charging the commission  on the
balance  administered. After the fixed fee had been abolished,  AFPs increased  their variable fees, as
shown in Table 3.  They now range from a low of 2.29 percent of salaries to 2.5 percent.  The
amendment  also allows for discrimination  of commission  between affiliates in order to discourage
them from switching AFPs.  For benefit payments,  both fixed and variable commissions  are still
allowed.
In 1994, the commissions  collected  by the AFPs covered only 45 percent of the operating
costs. Although  income from commissions  more than doubled  during 1995,  it was sufficient  to cover
only 80 percent of operating  costs due to the AFPs  expansion  of their salesforces.  As a percentage  of
covered salaries,  the operating  costs have fallen from 2.6 percent in 1994  to 2.2 percent in 1995 and
declined  further  to 1 percent in 1996. This represents  a decrease  from 26 to 13 to 4.5 percent of the
total assets accumulated  in the funds  at the end of each year.
Out of the five AFPs only one, Integra,  has been able to break even. All other companies
have  been running high operating  losses. The accumulated  losses  of the system  amount  to more  than
S. 200 million  (approx.US$82  million)  corresponding  to two thirds of the AFPs' total capital  .
Fund  Accumulation  and Investment
The total funds under management  by the AFP system amounted to S.2.3 billion or about
US$ 1 billion at the end of  1996, corresponding  to about 1.5 percent of GDP.  Out of the total
contribution  rate of currently 11 percent, 8 percent is used for long-term capital accumulation. The
monthly  inflow is about  US$25 million. It was originally  planned  to increase  the contribution  rate for
capital accumulation  to 10  percent starting  January 1997,  but in the recent amendment  to the law, this
increase has now been delayed until after December 1998. There is no income ceiling for the
15calculation of pension contributions and  mandatory  contributions are not deductible from income
tax.  Pensions are also subject to income tax, which means that effectively workers are taxed twice.
Voluntary  contributions  by  employers  are possible  without  limit;  contributions  made  by
employers on behalf of their employees are deductible from taxation.  There are no tax incentives for
individual  workers'  voluntary  contributions,  however.  Independent  workers  are  not  allowed  to
contribute more than 20 percent of their earnings because  of the non-attachability of the affiliates'
funds.
In the November  1996  amendment, the scope  of  voluntary savings  was  widened.  Now
affiliates are allowed to  save voluntarily not only for their retirement but also  for other purposes.
Eligibility  for these  savings plans,  however, is subject to  several restrictions  such as  a minimum
period of affiliation with the private pension system or a minimum age of the affiliate.  AFPs are
allowed to charge a fee for the withdrawal of voluntary savings for purposes other than retirement.
The investment of the funds is subject to strict rules and regulations which are issued by the
SAFP.  These rules are designed to protect the interests of the affiliates and are aimed at ensuring
safety and profitability of the funds'  investments.  To meet these objectives, pension funds must be
properly  diversified and invested  only in approved  assets, while at the  same time the investments
must  seek to  achieve the highest return possible under  the given restrictions.  Like  in Chile  and
Argentina, the rules prescribe only maximum but no minimum investment limits.
T'he maximum investment limits are established by the Central Bank in consultation with the
SAFP.  Table 4 summarized the investment limits for the authorized classes of instruments.  Central
bank authorization is required for investment in foreign securities.  Up until now foreign investment
has not been allowed.  However, it is expected that investment of pension funds in Brady Bonds will
soon be authorized by the SAFP.
Corporate and financial sector issues are also subject to limits determined in relation to the
consolidated capital of the issuer, the size of the AFP and its market share as well as the risk rating of
the issue.  All instruments except for securities issued by the government and the Central Bank are
subject to risk  classification.  Companies classifying the risk  of AFP investments are required  to
register  with  the  SAFP.  Since this  industry has yet  to  develop, however,  a  Risk Classification
Commission consisting of government officials and financial sector representatives will be in charge
of risk classification until mid-1998.
Pension  funds are valued  daily and  marked to market.  Like in Chile  and  Argentina,  the
Peruvian system originally had a minimum profitability guarantee in order to protect affiliates from
strong fluctuations in the return of the funds.  The minimum return was defined, like in Chile, as the
lesser of  50 percent of the average 12-month real rate of return of the system or 2 percentage points
under  the real rate of return.  Peruvian AFPs, just  like Chilean AFPs, were required to maintain  a
fluctuation reserve.  If an AFP performed above the benchmark, it was required to transfer the excess
return  to  a  fluctuation  reserve  instead  of  crediting  it  to  the  affiliates'  balances.  If  an  AFP
underperformed, the shortfall had to be made up first from the fluctuation reserve and, if this was not
sufficient, then from the mandatory reserve (encaje).
In  the  November  1996  amendment,  the  upper  band  of  the  profitability  guarantee  was
removed  and  thus the  fluctuation reserve  was abolished.  At  the  moment,  there  is no  minimum
profitability guarantee at all; the law provides for a minimum profitability requirement to be regulated
16by the  SAPF but,  as already noted  above, no  such regulation has  been issued  to date.  The only
reserve that the AFPs still have to keep to protect affiliates in the case of fraud or mismanagement is
the encaje.  This mandatory reserve not only depends on the size of the fund under management (as
in Chile) but also on  the risk of the fund's investments.
Table 4
Investment Limits (11/1996)
Instruments  % of assets
Individual limits
a) Government securities  30
b) Central Bank securities  30
c) Fixed-term deposits  30
d) Financial sector bonds  25
e) Short term debt  10
f) Corporate bonds  35
g) Common shares  20
h) Workers'  shares  20
i) Preferred share certificates  10
j) Short term margin loans  10
k) Derivatives  10
1) Mutual funds  10
m) Primary issues for new ventures  10
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Table 5
AFP Investments (% of total assets)
12/93  12/94  12/95  12/96
Government bonds  13.0  6.0  1.7  0.6
BCR deposits  18.9  20.0  20.5  0.0
Bank deposits  61.4  34.2  27.0  25.0
Bank bonds  6.7  20.2  21.7  18.2
Corporate bonds  0  3.3  9.5  22.1
Equities  0  14.2  18.1  31.9
Other  0  1.9  1.4  2.3
Source: SAFP
17The portfolio  of the AFPs has been  diversified considerably since the start  of the system.
While most of the funds were placed in bank deposits in the beginning, already about a quarter of
total assets  were invested  in shares by  the end  of 1996.  This represented  about  1 percent  of the
market capitalization of the Lima Stock Exchange (Salomon Brothers 1996).  In Chile, pension fund
investment in equities was still zero 5 years after the  start of the AFP system, but they  have now
reached 30% of assets and about 10% of the Santiago market capitalization.
Investment  of pension  funds  in  foreign  securities  is theoretically  subject to  a  limit  of  5
percent  of  assets.  However, the  real restriction  appears  to  lie  in  the  fact  that  a  list  of  foreign
investments needs to be permitted and risk-rated before AFPs can invest and that not many permitted
foreign instruments have been identified yet.  Further, as observed in other countries, pension fund
managers seem to have a home bias in their investment strategies for reasons  such as the costs of
hiring  staff  to  analyze  overseas  markets,  opposition  of  affiliates  to  foreign  investment  and  the
assumption that the downside risk of overseas investment outweighs the potential benefits of higher
returns  (Downs  1996).  It is expected that the SAFP will authorize AFP investments  in Peruvian
Brady Bonds in 1997 and that the AFPs will take advantage of this investment opportunity.
About  77 percent of the portfolio  is denominated in soles and 23 percent is in US dollars.
Bank deposits are generally of less than 90 days term.  Of these, 25 percent are dollar denominated,
20 percent sole-denominated but indexed, and 55 percent sole-denominated but non-indexed.  Fixed-
income investments account for about 70 percent of all assets.
The AFPs portfolio shows a very high exposure to the banking sector which  at the end of
1996 accounted for 39 percent of all investments (bonds, deposits and shares).  The AFP regulations
do not limit the overall exposure of AFPs to the banking sector.  If investments in other  financial
institutions,  such as leasing companies and consumer credit institutions, are also taken into account,
the  share  of  financial  sector  investments  reaches  46  percent.  Particularly  the  large  share  of
subordinated bank bonds in the AFP portfolio  could cause problems.  These bonds are treated  as
capital in the  Peruvian banking regulations  and  are admitted  for the  AFPs reserving  purposes  as
encaje  (Downs 1996).  Since in terms of risk, the subordinated bonds are closer to equity than bonds,
this could mean that the reserves might turn out to be insufficient, particularly as AFPs are no longer
required  to maintain fluctuation reserves.  Moreover, the subordinated bonds,  though quasi-equity
instruments, are likely to be remunerated like debt instruments.
Investments in the industrial sector make  up 20 percent of the portfolio;  the mining  sector
accounts for 7.8 percent and public services for 18.6 percent.  The single largest investment of the
private pension system is in corporate bonds and shares of the telephone company, Telefonica  del
Peru, amounting to 14.3 percent of all assets.
The differences between the portfolios of the 5 AFPs are small.  The reason for the similar
investment  choices  may  be  due  to  several  factors,  including  the  direct  and  indirect  regulatory
restrictions  and the limited availability of investment instruments. The Peruvian govemment has not
issued  long term debt  since the late  1980s and there  is a  limited supply of long-term government
bonds on the market. Trading on the Lima Stock Exchange is very limited; it averages less than US$
20 million  a day and only about half of the stocks are actively traded.  In 1996, the equity trading
volume  corresponded to about 6 percent of GDP (IFC 1997).  There are 60 bonds of 21  corporate
issuers listed with a total face value of about US$ 340 million with two large companies, Telefonica
del Peru and Consorcio de Alimentos Fabril Pacifico, accounting for 30 and 26 percent, respectively
(Downs 1996)
18As shown in Table 6, the real rate of return of the Peruvian AFPs has been 7.1 percent since
the start of the system in 1993.  Until January 1997, AFPs were only required to report and publish
their  returns  without  taking  account  of  their  commissions.  Now,  however,  returns  net  of
commissions will have  to be reported.  According to World Bank calculations, the returns net  of
commissions for a worker who joined the new pension system in July 1993 were - 0.32% in 1994. -
0.92%,  and 4.46% in 1996 (Shah 1997).
Although  it  is  important  to  inform  affiliates  about  the  actual  costs  of  the  system,  it  is
questionable whether reporting on net of commissions basis will greatly increase transparency.  Since
commissions are charged as percentage of the workers'  salaries,  the rate of return on the affiliates'
balance depends on the time that the affiliate has been contributing.  In Colombia, for example, the
net rates of return are given for members who joined at the beginning of the system only.  Unless the
rates are given for members who joined at different times, the information will be of limited value to
the workers.  Any  information on net returns given to workers should also include projections  of
expected  future performance  over their  full careers.  Otherwise,  the front loading  of commission
charges might discourage workers from joining the AFP system.
Table 6
Real Rates of Return (in %)
AFP  12/93-  12/94-  12/95 - Annual average
12/94  12/95  12/96  7/93 - 12/96
Profuturo  10.6  5.9  7.4  7.6
Horizonte  8.6  6.0  5.0  6.9
Integra  7.9  5.3  6.3  6.8
Nueva Vida  10.2  5.4  5.5  7.9
Union  7.9  5.8  4.6  7.2
El Roble  7.5  3.5  -
Average  8.6  5.5  5.8  7.1
Source: SAFP
Old Age Benefits
The retirement  age in  the Peruvian pension  system is 65  years  for men  and women.  At
retirement,  the accumulated balance and, if the pensioner had contributed to the old public pension
system,  the  recognition  bond  are  converted  to  monthly  pension  payments.  Early  retirement  is
possible only if the balance accumulated in the individual account is sufficient to finance a pension
equivalent  to 50  percent of the average salary during the last  10 years.  The law contemplates  4
different types of old age benefits: programmed withdrawal, personal annuity, family annuity, and a
combination  of  programmed  withdrawal  and  annuity.  A  pensioner  choosing  the  programmed
withdrawal  option will receive  monthly payments based  on the  individual life expectancy.  If the
beneficiary dies before the balance is drawn down, the survivors will inherit the remaining balance.
19Under the option of personal annuity, the beneficiary would use the balance in the individual
account to purchase an annuity from the AFP.  In this case, the AFP would be required to establish a
system of self-insurance by creating a longevity fund using the balances of all affiliates which have
chosen this option.  This mechanism is regulated by the pension law.  Currently, however, AFPs are
not yet permitted to offer this option and all annuities are available only from insurance companies.
Family  annuities,  which  provide  first  a  pension  to  the  affiliate  and  later  survivors'  benefits  to
dependent  family  members,  are available  only  from insurance  companies  and  the  law  does not
envisage AFPs offering this option.
The Peruvian AFP pension system does not have a minimum pension guarantee.  In Chile,
members who have contributed for at least 20 years but do not reach the minimum pension level are
entitled to a supplement payable by  the government.  Further, pensioners with  at least 20 years of
contributions  who  choose  the  phased  withdrawal  option and  outlive  their  benefit  payments  also
receive  a  government-financed minimum pension.  Neither  of these guarantees  currently  exists in
Peru.  In  1995, an  amendment established  the possibility  of introducing  a minimum  pension by
decree, but no guarantee has been given yet, however.  Since the minimum profitability requirement
has also not been  specified yet, there does not seem to be  a safety net  at all for pensioners  of the
private pension system.  Peru also does not have a social assistance scheme, which would take care of
old age poverty.
The  absence  of a  minimum  pension  guarantee  and  of a  specified  minimum  profitability
requirement,  coupled  with  the  continuing requirement  to  place  all  funds  with  one  AFP  account
exposes individual workers to the risk of substantial losses in cases where fund managers were to
suffer  substantial,  and much above average, losses.  Individual workers could suffer  from a wide
dispersion of returns that could be the result of the greater choice given to AFPs to have less uniform
portfolios  and of  aberrant behavior  by  some fund managers.  This  is  an issue  that  confronts  all
privately managed mandatory pension pillars based on individual capitalization accounts.
Contributions to the pension system were initially tax-deductible  but since June  1995 have
been payable out of  after-tax income.  However, pensions are subject to income tax, which means
that  workers are subject to double taxation.
The number of pensioners  in the Peruvian private pension system is still small.  By August
1996, only  134 old age pensioners,  85  disability  pensioners  and  3,559  survivors  were receiving
benefits.  Of the old age pensioners, about a third had chosen phased withdrawal, a third an annuity,
and a third the combination of the two.
Disability and Survivors'  Benefits
The AFPs are required to provide their affiliates with coverage against the risks of disability
and survivorship.  Currently,  all AFPs  insure their members with approved  insurance  companies.
The law contemplates, however, that after five years of operations, AFPs may also self-insure these
risks  in  which  case  they  would  be required  to  establish  a  special  fund and  purchase  additional
reinsurance.  Further, it is envisaged that in the future workers will be able to individually choose
their insurance company instead of the AFPs negotiating a group insurance plan for all its affiliates.
20In Peru,  the  premium  for  disability  and  survivors'  insurance is not  included  in the  total
commission but charged separately.  The insurance premium has come down considerably since the
start of the system.  While insurance companies charged 2.2 percent of salaries in the beginning, the
premium now amounts to 1.23 percent of salaries.  Insurance premiums are payable up to a monthly
salary ceiling  of currently about  S. 4,700 or US$  1,900.  Disability is determined by  two medical
committees, first by the AFPs'  committee and then by the superintendency.  Insurance coverage does
not extend to preexisting conditions leading to death or disability in the first 6 months after affiliation
in the SPP.
The benefit  for  full  disability  amounts to 70  percent of the  insured's  salary.  Survivors'
benefits  amount to 35 percent for the widow and  14 percent for each child or surviving parent.  In
addition, the insurance covers funeral grants for which purpose a lower contribution ceiling is applied
than for disability and survivors'  insurance.
The disability and survivors' insurance will top up the disabled or deceased members'
accounts in order to reach a lump-sum sufficient to provide the defined benefits.  Currently, however,
a temporary exception is made to reduce the impact on the insurance companies'  cash flow.  Instead
of providing a lump-sum to the AFPs, the insurance companies receive the member's balance from
the AFPs and then pay out the benefits to the disability pensioner or the survivors.
Conclusions
*  The evolution of the private pension funds in Peru was seriously affected by the "unfair"
competition between the private and public pillars. Lower contribution rates  and lower
retirement ages for affiliates of the public pillar greatly reduced the attractiveness of the
private pension funds.
- The AFPs have suffered from poor financial results.  AFP revenues have been lower than
in Argentina and Chile due to the lower salary levels of affiliates.  Peruvian AFPs have
not been  given the permission to defer start-up costs, which has resulted  in substantial
losses of the AFP's capital.
*  In Peru, a continuous diversification of the pension funds' portfolio can be observed. The
percentage of assets invested in equities has been growing particularly fast and reached
more than 25 percent by the end of 1996.
*  Despite increasing diversification of instruments, the AFPs' portfolios continue to have a
high  share of investments in the banking sector and other financial  institutions.  This
represents  significant exposure to an economic sector that is in most countries highly
leveraged  and  exposed  to  the  adverse  effects of  financial  crises.  A  more  balanced
sectoral diversification of investments would be desirable.
21III. STRUCTURE  AND PERFORMANCE  OF THE PRIVATE  PENSION
SYSTEM IN COLOMBIA
In  April  1994,  Colombia  introduced  a  new  privately  managed  pension  scheme  as  an
alternative to its existing public pension system. Like in the case of Peru, affiliation in the new system
is not mandatory but depends on the choice of each individual worker.  The private pension system
has many of the features of the Chilean system. It was modified, however, in several areas to take
account of the characteristics of the Colombian financial sector and the existing institutional structure
of social protection.
The most important differences from the Chilean model are:
*  Workers are allowed to switch every 3 years between the public and private systems.
*  New labor force entrants are not required to join the private system.
*  Subsidies,  financed  through  an  additional  percentage  point  of  contributions  and
government transfers, are provided to enable low income groups to join  either pension
system.
*  The contribution rate is payable by employers (75 percent) and employees (25 percent).
*  AFPs are allowed to operate more than one fund.
*  Workers are allowed to have more than one account.
*  The regulations on ownership of AFPs are more relaxed.
*  There is no separate independent supervisory agency for pensions. The pension funds are
supervised by the Pension Department of the Bank Superintendency.
*  A variety of AFP fees is permitted, including fee differentiation between affiliates.  AFPs
have so far applied fees per collection but not on assets.
*  Fees  are capped at  3.5 percent  of workers'  salaries  and  AFPs are required  to  report
returns net of commissions.
*  The retirement ages are 57 years for women and 62 years for men.
Main Features of the Pension System
Affiliation in either the public or the private pension system is mandatory in Colombia for all
dependent workers of the public and the private sector; independent workers may join either system
voluntarily, provided their contributions reach a minimum level. Workers already affiliated in the old
system are allowed to  switch to the new system at any moment and affiliation of new labor force
entrants in the new system is not mandatory.
The Colombian law is even less restrictive than the Peruvian in that workers may switch back
and forth between the public and the private system every three years while in Peru this was allowed
only during an initial period and only for a restricted group of affiliates.  Moreover, various groups of
workers, such as workers in the oil sector, have their own schemes, which continue in existence after
the passage of the reform program.
22The coverage of the public and private pension systems together amounts to less than  40
percent of the economically active population. The low coverage is partly due to the large size of the
informal sector in Colombia but also partly to a high degree of evasion on the part of employers.  In
addition,  the public pension  system is still highly fragmented and is only  slowly becoming more
unified.  Before the pension reform of 1994, pensions were provided by a pension system for private
sector employees and more than  1,000 public sector pension institutions.
In  addition,  various  other  pension  plans  were  offered  directly  by  public  and  private
enterprises  for their employees; these plans in some cases allowed the employers to opt out of the
mandatory  public  system.  The  fragmentation  of  the  system  caused  considerable  administrative
problems  and presented an obstacle to labor mobility as benefits were usually not portable between
the  various  schemes.  This  fragmentation  continues  to  be  a  problem  as unification  or  even  a
harmonization of terms and conditions has yet to take place.
To further extend coverage, particularly to low income groups, Colombia has introduced an
element of redistribution in its private pillar.  All workers earning more than 4 times the minimum
wage are required to contribute an additional 1 percent of their income to the Solidarity Pension Fund
(Fondo de Solidaridad Pensional).  These contributions are matched by government transfers to the
fund.  The  fund  is  managed  by  the  government  and  its  resources  are  used  to  supplement  the
contributions of workers, both  wage earners and  independent workers, to  enable them  to join  the
pension system.  The workers supported with this subsidy have the choice of joining either the public
or the private system.  There is no universal entitlement to this subsidy for all low-income workers,
however.  The program is targeted in certain areas and subsidies are given on a discretionary basis.
Recognition Bonds
Like Chile and Peru, Colombia has chosen the concept of recognition bonds to compensate
workers  switching  over  to  the  new  system  for previous  contributions  to  the  old  system.  The
Colombian recognition bond, however, is not calculated to reflect the actual amount of contributions
that workers made  to the old system; instead, it seeks to compensate workers according to the net
present value of the future pension they would have received from the old system.  This approach
was chosen because contributions to the public system were mostly very low and it was very difficult
to reconstruct the individual workers' contribution histories (Ayala 1996).
The bond is calculated as the amount that should have been saved in the individual account in
order to accumulate the necessary capital to finance an annuity equal to the corresponding pension
entitlement in the old system.  The calculation mechanism is complicated.  First, the future pension
entitlement  of a worker remaining  in  the public  system is estimated.  This projection  takes  into
account the  current salary of the worker and the ratio of pre-retirement  salaries  and  the national
average salary.  There is a maximum ceiling set on the projected benefit: 90 percent of the last salary
or 15 minimum salaries whichever is lower.  Then, the net present value of the projected pension is
calculated.  The value of the bond is determined as the amount that the worker would have had to
save corresponding to his or her period of contributions to the public system in order to finance the
reference pension assuming a constant pace of accumulation.  For the calculation, a constant real rate
of return of 3 percent per year is assumed.
23Recognition bonds are endorsed to AFPs or insurance companies and the proceeds must be
deposited in the individual account.  The bonds mature upon retirement,  disability or death of the
worker.  If a workers'  balance in the individual account is sufficient to finance 110 percent  of the
minimum pension, the bonds may also be redeemed earlier, either for early retirement or for other
uses  of the excess  capital; for example to purchase shares of public  enterprises.  In these  cases,
recognition  bonds  can be  traded  on  the  secondary market  by  AFPs  and  insurance  companies,
although the trading has to be authorized by the affiliate.  Recognition bonds have started to trade on
the secondary market with a discount of 8 percent (Salomon Brothers 1996).
As  in  the  case  of  the  Peruvian  pension  reform,  Colombia  too  has  been  experiencing
implementation  problems  with  the recognition  bonds.  In  contrast  to  the  other  Latin  American
countries, which reformed their pension systems, Colombia is faced with a special difficulty due to its
extremely  fragmented  system for  public  sector employees  and  the  fiscal  decentralization  of the
country  (Queisser  1995).  Unlike  Chile,  which  unified  the  different  systems  in  an  umbrella
organization,  Colombia has kept  all of its different public pension institutions with  the result that
there is not one single institution responsible for issuing the bonds.
While  the bonds,  for  which the  central  government is responsible,  are  now being  issued
without major delays, the regional governments are still not fully complying with their obligation to
issue  bonds for  affiliates  switching from regional public  sector  funds to  the new private  system.
Problems also arise with the regional recognition bonds, which are due to workers who are switched
to the public system ISSS as more and more regional public funds are closed down.  The option of
switching  back  and  forth  between  the  public  and  private  systems  will  further  complicate  the
management of recognition bonds.  The bonds are cashed in and the proceeds go to the public system
when affiliates who switched first from the public to the private system return to the public scheme
again.
Affiliation
Affiliation in mandatory private pension funds stood at about 2.1 million in December 1996,
corresponding to  18 percent of the economically active population.  About 2.6 million workers are
affiliated in the other pension schemes of the public system, which would correspond to an additional
22 percent of the economically active population.  This number is a rough estimate, however, since
the files of the public system have not been revised and cleaned and the errors in the registers are
considered to be substantial.
Ninety  five percent  of the  affiliates  in  the private  system are  dependent  workers.  The
majority of affiliates are young: 79 percent are between 15 and 34 years old.  The income distribution
of affiliates is the following: 77 percent earn less than 2 minimum salaries; 14 percent earn between 2
and 4 minimum salaries; and 9 percent have an income of more than 4 minimum salaries.
The new pension system started in April 1994 with about 300,000 affiliates.  During the first
months, the affiliation pattern was very similar to  that observed in Peru with more  than  100,000
workers joining the new system every month.  Monthly affiliation then declined, the monthly increase
of total affiliation was about 4.4 percent on average during 1995 and around 3 percent during 1996.
24The private pension system in Colombia took off more smoothly than in Peru and monthly
affiliations in the initial period were within the range of what the industry had expected.  This was
due mainly to two reasons.  First, competition between the public and private system took place under
more even conditions than in Peru.  In Colombia, the public system was at least partly rationalized as
part of the reform.  Benefit eligibility conditions as well as contribution rates were brought in line
with the parameters  of the private  system so that there  was no  cost differential between  the two
systems.  But the impact of the rationalization could have been greater if the transition period to the
new less generous conditions was shorter.  The incentive to affiliate with the new system would also
have been  stronger if the new rules had been applied to  all workers and not just  to younger  ones
(those below 35 for women and below 40 for men).
Second,  workers  were  already  familiar  with  the  concept  of  private  fund  management
companies  due to the Colombian severance program.  Severance funds, which are compulsory, are
already  administered  by  private  fund  managers.  Employers  are  required  to  provide  severance
benefits of one month's  salary per year  of employment with an interest rate of 12 percent.  These
benefits are financed with a contribution rate of  8.33 percent of wages.  Workers are allowed partial
withdrawal of the funds for housing and education expenses.  Since 1990 the severance program has
been  administered  by  private  mutual  funds.  These  funds  have  provided  the  basis  for  the
establishment of the new private pension system.
Due  to  the  short  existence  of the  new  system  and  given the  requirement  of three-year
intervals between transfers, there has not been any switching back to the public system yet.  It is not
expected, however, that workers who are in the accumulation phase  will switch back to the public
system in great numbers.  More transfers may take place shortly before retirement if, depending on
the investment performance  of their individual accounts, workers might find it beneficial to switch
back to the public system in order to collect higher pension payments.
At the end of 1996, 41 percent of all affiliates in the private system were new entrants to the
labor force, while 59 percent had switched over from the public system.  According to the Banking
Superintendency, the majority  of new labor force entrants choose to join the new private  system,
although there are no official numbers available.  Affiliates are allowed to switch AFPs every six
months.
There is no official data on the ratio of affiliates and contributors in Colombia.  Given that in
Chile,  Argentina  and  Peru,  about 45  to  50  percent  of all  affiliates  contribute  regularly  to  their
accounts, a similar ratio can also be expected for the case of Colombia.  Further, there has been a
serious problem of duplicate affiliation in the private system. More than 177,000 workers were found
to  be  simultaneously  affiliated  with  more  than  one  AFP.  The revision  of  the  files  has  led  to
substantial adjustment of affiliation numbers in some AFPs.  In the case of one AFP, the cleaning of
files resulted in a decrease of affiliation by more than 46,000 workers.
25Management  Companies
The Colombian rules and regulations for the management of pension funds follow the
Chilean example  closely  but are less draconian  in several  areas. The management  companies,  called
Administradoras  de Fondos de Pensiones Obligatorias (AFPs) have to be set up as joint-stock
companies  or as cooperatives  with the sole purpose  of managing pension funds. Companies,  which
were already  managing  severance  funds,  have  been allowed  to also manage  pension funds  as long as
the two businesses are separated financially. Further, AFPs may also manage voluntary pension
funds,  which are subject  to less strict  rules and regulations. The voluntary  pension  business  has to be
separated  from the management  of the compulsory  pension funds.
The ownership  regulations  for pension fund  management  companies  are less restrictive than
in Chile. In Colombia,  AFP shares can be held by public sector institutions,  by cooperatives,  labor
unions, mutual funds, cooperative banks ,and family benefit funds (Cajas de  Compensacion
Familiar). Insurance  companies  and other financial  institutions  are also allowed to be shareholders
of AFPs.
Colombia  did not choose to establish  a separate  independent  supervisory  agency  for the new
pension system. Instead,  the AFPs are licensed,  regulated  and supervised  by the Pension  Department
of Superintendencia  Bancaria, the agency supervising the banking system as well as insurance
companies and other financial institutions. The rules and regulations for the pension system are
issued  by the Ministry of Finance. The decision  to integrate  pension fund supervision  with banling
supervision was motivated by the fear that an additional superintendency  might be  subject to
regulatory capture. Further,  much of the existing  regulatory  framework  for the financial sector also
applies  to the pension system and therefore  it was seen as inefficient  to create an additional agency
(Ayala 1996). The Superintendencia  Bancaria  also supervises  the public pension system, including
the decentralized public sector pension funds.  The Superintendencia  Bancaria is effectively an
umbrella regulatory body with departments  dealing with banks, insurance companies, and pension
funds.
The minimum capital required to set up an AFP is defined as 50 percent of the capital
required  to establish  a financial  corporation. The minimum  capital  for AFPs currently  corresponds  to
about US$4 million. To limit concentration  in the AFP market, there is a ceiling on the maximum
capital of AFPs set at 10 times the minimum  capital. AFPs are allowed  to manage assets up to 40
times their capital.  The law contemplates  the possibility  of government  subsidies  and other incentives
for cooperatives  and other institutions  of the  "solidarity  sector",  i.e. cooperatives  and other  non-profit
organizations,  to set up AFPs.
All pension fund management  companies  have to establish compulsory  reserves to ensure
safety and liquidity. First, AFPs are subject to the reserve requirements  for financial institutions,
which mandate  a reserve  of 50 percent of the subscribed  capital. In addition, 10 percent of annual
profits have to be transferred  to this reserve.
Second,  AFPs must establish  a reserve for stabilization  of returns. Like in most other Latin
American countries,  AFPs are required to reach a minimum  profitability  benchmark. In Colombia,
the benchmark is calculated  as a combination  of the average performance  of the industry and a
26composite  index of financial  sector  performance. The stabilization  reserve  requirement  is identical  to
the encaje rule in Chile mandating  a reserve  of 1 percent of assets under  management.
Third, AFPs in  Colombia must also contribute to the  financial sector guarantee fund
(FOGAFIN),  which protects  members' contributions  in the case of liquidation  of an AFP. This fund
guarantees 100  percent of the mandatory  contributions  plus interest  and voluntary  contributions  up to
a ceiling of 150 minimum salaries  (Ayala 1996). If any of the mandatory  pension reserves are not
kept at the required  levels,  AFPs must pay penalties. These  go to the Solidarity  Pension  Fund,  which
is used for extension  of coverage  as described  earlier.
Like in Chile,  the pension assets have to be legally and financially  separated  from the assets
of the pension fund management  companies. In Colombia,  however,  AFPs are allowed to manage
more than one pension plan for the affiliates. Affiliates who have reached a minimum  balance in
their individual  account  are allowed  to invest the excess in different  pension  plans. In order to make
use of this option, affiliates  must have saved at least 50 percent of the capital necessary  to finance  a
minimum  pension and the Superintendency  has to verify that the alternative  plans provide  sufficient
coverage in the events of longevity and survivorship. If a worker has saved 100 percent of the
necessary  capital there are no further  restrictions. The law also envisages  the possibility  for affiliates
to reject the minimum profitability guarantee if they want to invest in riskier portfolios. At the
moment,  no such alternative  pension plans are offered yet.  Given that almost 80 percent of the
affiliates are younger than 35 years and incomes are low, not many workers qualify yet for this
option. However,  several  AFPs  are in the  process of developing  new products.
Market Concentration
When the new pension system started in April 1994, 8 of the 10 existing severance fund
management  companies  were licensed to manage  pension funds. In December of the same year, an
additional  company  was licensed to manage only pension funds. At the end of  1996,  there were 8
companies managing both pension and severance funds, 1 company  managing only pension funds
and 1 company managing only severance  funds.  To date, there has been only one merger in the
Colombian  pension system:  in late 1996,  the funds under management  and the affiliates  of the fund
management  company  Invertir  was  taken over by Horizonte.
The Colombian  private pension system is far less concentrated  than the Peruvian system.
The top three companies  control  60 percent of the market in terms  of affiliates  and 55 percent of the
assets under management compared to  76 and 74 percent in  Peru.  The Herfindahl index of
concentration  is 1776  in the case of affiliates  and 1710  for the assets  under management. In Peru, the
figures are 2312 and 2295, respectively. Market concentration  in Colombia  is also lower than in
Chile when the system first started and the Herfindahl index was 2200. Compared to Argentina,
however,  the Colombian  market is much  more concentrated; in Argentina,  the index in March 1997
was 1121  for affiliates  and 1158  for assets under  management  (Vittas 1997a).
There are 4 AFPs with foreign shareholders:  Porvenir, the largest AFP both in terms of
affiliation and assets under management,  has a 20 percent participation  of the Chilean  pension fund
management  company  Provida. Citibank  Overseas  and the Chilean group  Cruz Blanca,  which is also
involved in the Chilean pension system, each own 26.6 percent of Colfondos, while 50 percent of
27Colmena  is owned  by AIG Holding. Pensionar  has a 30 percent  participation  of the Swedish  insurer
Skandia.
Table  7
Market  Concentration  of Compulsory  Pension  Funds  (1/1997)
Fund
AFP  Affiliates  %  (billion  %
Pesos)
Porvenir  619,423  29.85  212.3  24.36
Colfondos  309,434  14.91  146.1  16.76
Horizonte  331,756  15.99  121.9  14.00
Proteccion  279,027  13.45  186.2  21.37
Colmena  239,594  11.55  94.7  10.85
Davivir  157,452  7.59  45.6  5.23
Colpatria  121,856  5.87  53.0  6.08
Pensionar  16,524  0.80  11.7  1.34
Total  2,075,066  100.00  871.5  100.00
Herfindahl  1776  1710
Index
Source:  Asofondos
Porvenir focuses on mass affiliation in its marketing  strategy targeting  predominantly  the
lower income groups. Two of its largest shareholders  are Banco de Bogota and Banco  de Occidente,
which have extensive national networks.  85 percent of Porvenir's affiliates earn less than 2
minimum  salaries. While Colfondos  also has more than 70 percent of its affiliates in that income
bracket, it has also been able to attract a considerable  share of the high income earners. It has been
targeting large companies in order to achieve a high ratio of contributors to affiliates (Salomon
Brothers 1996).
The other two AFPs,  which have been successful  in attracting  higher income affiliates, are
Protecci6n  and Pensionar.  Protecci6n  captures about 27 percent of the market in the income
brackets  above 10  minimum  salaries. Pensionar's  share in total affiliates  in this income  range is low
due to its small size, but higher income earners correspond  to  a higher percentage of its  total
affiliation  than in the other AFPs. In terms of fund per affiliate,  Pensionar  ranks first, followed  by
Protecci6n  and Colfondos.
Porvenir  is also the market leader in the area of severance  funds  with a share of 29 percent
of all affiliates and 27 percent of severance  assets under management,  followed  by Horizonte  and
Protecci6n. The voluntary  pension market is dominated  by Protecci6n, which has 59 percent of all
affiliates contributing  for voluntary  pensions and 46 percent of assets under management,  followed
by Colfondos  with 15  percent of affiliates  and Davivir  with 6 percent.
28Financial Condition of AFPs
The total capital of the AFP industry  amounted to about 250 billion pesos (about US$ 236
million) at the end of 1996. Due to high operational  losses of  more than 170 billion pesos (about
US$ 160  million),  which corresponded  to almost  70 percent of total capital,  the net worth of the AFP
system amounted  to only 73 billion (about  US$68  million). The operational  losses  were basically  due
to high advertising  costs and salaries for the salesforce. In 1996, about 40 percent of operational
expenditure  was spent on the salesforce and 10 percent on advertising. The share of advertising
expenditure  is relatively low in the AFPs' financial statements,  because the superintendency  took
account of the high start-up  costs in advertising  and allowed  the AFPs to amortize  the costs incurred
in  1994, i.e. during the first 9 months of the system, over a two-year period.  Compared  to the
treatment of start-up costs of the Argentine system, this regulation is still relatively strict.  In
Argentina, the AFJPs were first given a 3-year period to amortize the costs, but this was later
extended  to 10 years. According  to AFP industry studies,  the Colombian  companies  expect  to break
even after 4 years of operations.
According  to the law, AFPs  are allowed  to charge  5 different  kinds of commissions:
*  a commission  for the management  of mandatory  contributions;
*  a commission  for the management  of voluntary  contributions;
*  a commission  for the management  of dormant  balances;
*  a commission  for the administration  of phased withdrawal  of balances upon retirement;
and
*  a commission  for the transfer  of balances  of affiliates  switching  to other  AFPs.
The AFPs are free to choose  the base for the calculation  of commissions,  i.e. they can charge
fees as a percentage of the affiliates' base salary, of the contributions,  or of the balance in the
individual  account. The only restriction  imposed  by the law is that total commissions,  including  the
premiums charged for disability and survivors' insurance, may not exceed 3.5 percent of  the
contributor's  base salary. Also, the Colombian  law allows for fee differentiation  for affiliates  within
the same  AFP, for example  to offer discounts  to affiliates  who stay for a certain  minimum  period in
one AFP.  All of the commissions  currently  charged are variable commissions  calculated as a
percentage  of the contributor's  base salary;  none  of the AFPs is charging  a fixed commission  or
any asset-based  fees.
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AFP Charges
AFP  Commission  Insurance  Total
premium
Porvenir  1.50  2.00  3.50
Colfondos  1.45  2.05  3.50
Horizonte  1.50  2.00  3.50
Proteccion  1.50  2.00  3.50
Colmena  1.70  1.80  3.50
Davivir  1.50  2.00  3.50
Colpatria  1.40  2.10  3.50
Invertir  1.50  1.70  3.50
Pensionar  0.75  1.74  2.49
Source:  Superintendencia  Bancaria,  1/1997
There  is  a  different  fee  structure  for  severance  funds.  In  the  severance  business,  fund
management companies  are allowed to  charge fees on assets under  management (calculated  on a
daily basis)  corresponding to  a maximum of 4 percent  of assets  per  annum.  All but one  of the
severance fund management companies are charging the maximum fee of 4 percent.
The sales force of the Colombian AFP system increased from about 3,000 agents at the end
of 1995 to about 4,800 agents at the end of 1996. Measured by the number of affiliates per agent, the
Colombian AFPs employ  less agents than  the Peruvian pension  system. While the Peruvian AFPs
employed one agent for every 360 affiliates, there were 430 affiliates per  agent in Colombia at the
end of 1996. In Argentina, the private pension system employs one agent for  3,600 affiliates.
Fund Accumulation and Investment
The total funds under management of the mandatory pension system amounted to about 870
billion pesos at the end of 1996, corresponding to about US$823 million and approximately 1 percent
of  GDP.  Voluntary  pension funds had  assets  of an additional  74 billion  pesos  or about  US$69
million. The assets managed by the mandatory severance funds amounted to about 720 billion pesos
or US$680 million with a total of 1.7 million affiliates.  Total assets administered by the pension and
severance fund management companies thus amounted to US$1.57 billion and corresponded to about
1.7 percent of GDP.
The contribution rate to the individual pension account was initially set at 8 percent in 1994
and, as originally planned, was increased to 9 percent in 1995 and to 10 percent in 1996.  In addition,
up to 3.5 percent of salary are payable to cover disability and survivors' insurance as well as the fund
management commissions.  75 percent of the contribution is payable by the employer and 25 percent
by the worker.  Contributions are mandatory up to a pensionable salary of 20 minimum wages.  The
mandatory and voluntary contributions to the AFPs are deductible from income tax.
The  investment  regulations  are much  more relaxed  in  Colombia  than  in  Chile  or  Peru.
Investment in public debt is limited to 50 percent of assets under management.  Investrnent in equities
30and foreign securities  was allowed  from  the beginning  of the system. Contrary  to the practice  in most
other Latin American countries, the Colombian supervisors  require no risk evaluation prior to
investment. In Colombia,  no separate Risk Classification  Commission  like in Chile and Peru was
established. This was motivated  by the desire  to avoid the systemic  risk that would arise in having
only one public entity classifying investment instruments (Valdes Prieto 1996).  A private risk
classification sector is developing slowly.  APFs must value their assets daily but no uniform
valuation  rules are applied  (Ayala  1996).
Slightly different investment  rules are applied to voluntary  pension funds and to severance
funds. Severance  funds are also subject to a minimum  rate of return requirement  guaranteed  by the
government;  the benchmark  calculation  is very similar to that applied to mandatory  pension funds.
For voluntary  pension funds there is no minimum  return requirement  nor any government  guarantee
beyond the guarantee  of the financial  sector  fund  FOGAFIN.
The  portfolio of the Colombian  AFPs  has been diversified  only slowly  over the past years.  As
observed  in other Latin American  countries,  the portfolios  of the different AFPs are very similar in
their  composition. In  their  investment strategy, the AFPs have consistently shown a  strong
preference for fixed income securities.  In 1995,  almost 60 percent of assets were invested  in bonds
and term deposits.  By the end of 1996,  the share of term deposits was reduced significantly  to less
than 12 percent but there is still a strong emphasis  on bonds, particularly  those issued by financial
institutions as well as by quasi-public  entities such as the coffee stabilization  fund and the rural
development  fund. The high percentage  of assets invested  in the financial  sector gives less cause for
concern  than in the case of Peru since the Colombian  financial  sector  is considered  more solid than
the Peruvian  financial  institutions.  The AFPs' equity  investment  declined  from 3 percent of assets at
the end of 1994 to about 0.5 percent at the end of 1996. The low share of equity investment  is
primarily due to the fact that Colombia's stock market it not deep and trading is low. In 1996,  the
equity  trading volume  amounted  to only 1.6 percent  of GDP compared  to 6 percent in Peru and about
11  percent in Chile (IFC 1997).
31Table  9
Investment  Limits  for Mandatory  Pension  Funds
Instruments  % of assets
Individual  limits
a) Government securities  50
b) Other public debt instruments  20
c) Equities  30
d) Financial sector bonds  50
e) Corporate bonds  20
f) Securitized instruments*  20
g) Mortgage-backed securities  30
h) Foreign bonds and international mutual funds  10
invested in bonds
i) Stock index instruments  5
j) Mutual fund shares  5






*  limit of 15% for instruments backed by non-admitted assets, real estate and
infrastructure projects
Source: Superintendencia Bancaria, Circular Externa 041, May 1996
The Colombian AFPs have not yet invested in foreign securities although the law allows for
investment abroad of up to 5 percent of assets.  One reason for the absence of foreign investment is
the appreciation of the Colombian peso vis-a-vis the US dollar.  But more importantly, there is still no
uniform mechanism for the daily  valuation of foreign securities, which effectively  prevents  AFPs
from investing abroad.
The portfolio  composition  of voluntary pension funds is similar  to that of the mandatory
pension funds but with an even stronger emphasis on financial sector bonds, which  account for 39
percent of assets and bank term deposits with a share of 17 percent.  The severance funds' assets are
invested more heavily in short-term instruments due to the liquidity needs of the severance program
and the option for workers to withdraw funds for housing and education expenses.  More than half of
the severance funds' assets are invested in financial sector bonds and 24 percent of assets are kept in
term deposits.
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AFP Investment  Portfolio
12/95  9/96
Bonds*  33.8  0.0
Financial sector bonds  0.0  33.5
Term deposits  33.2  11.5
Corporate bonds  0.0  10.7
Treasury bills  0.0  9.4
Securitized instruments  0.0  7.3
Government bonds  0.0  6.1
Mortgages  3.9  6.0
Coffee savings bonds  6.3  5.6
Rural development  9.4  3.3
bonds
Equities  0.7  0.4
Others  12.7  6.2
*government, financial sector, and corporate bonds
Source: Superintendencia Bancaria
The calculation of the minimum rate of return for mandatory pension funds in Colombia is
very complicated.  It is determined as a composite of the AFP industry's  average performance  and
the performance of a reference portfolio defined by the superintendency.  Half of the minimum return
is determined as 90 percent of the weighted average performance of all pension funds.  In calculating
the average, the maximum weight of any one AFP may not exceed 20 percent.  The other half of the
minimum  return is calculated as the weighted average of (i) 90 percent of the performance  of the
country's  three  stock exchanges taking into  account the percentage  of pension assets  invested in
equities (but at  least 5 percent) and  (ii) 95 percent of the return achieved by a reference portfolio,
which in its composition takes into account the existing average portfolio of the AFP industry.
The performance of the mandatory pension funds is calculated as annualized rate of return
during the last 36 months (24 months in the case of severance funds).  During the first three years of
a pension  fund's  existence,  the rate  of return  will be  calculated for  the period since  the start  of
operations.  Compliance with the minimum rate of return will be checked by the Superintendency on
a quarterly basis.  If an AFP underperforms the benchmark, the shortfall has to be covered through
the stabilization reserve, which is established as described above.
In Colombia, AFPs are required to publish their returns both gross and net of commissions
(but not net of insurance premiums).  This rule applies to mandatory and voluntary pension funds as
well as to severance funds. Nominal gross and net returns are reported by the APFs and published by
the superintendency quarterly.
Nominal returns have been relatively stable given that fixed income securities make up the
largest part of the AFPs'  portfolios.  On average, the annual nominal return has been 35.7 percent
from the start of the AFP system to March 1997.  The returns of the individual APFs for the same
33period fluctuated between 37.4 and 34.7 percent.  The best performance was achieved by Colpatria,
followed by Protecci6n and Colmena.
In real terms, gross rates of return of the mandatory pension funds were 14.4 percent during
May-December  1994, i.e. during the first nine months of the system, 15.9 percent  in  1995, and  15
percent in 1996.  Returns net of commissions are reported only for affiliates who joined the system at
the beginning, i.e. in May 1994.
For  affiliates who joined the  private system  later, the returns would  be lower  since their
balances are lower.  Table  11 shows that real net returns were highly negative for the affiliates during
the first six months of the new pension system and slowly increased to more than 10 percent during
the third quarter of 1996.2
Table 11
Real Rates of Return Net of AFP Commissions (%)
5/94-  1/95-  7/95-  1/96-  5/94-
12/94  6/95  12/95  9/96  9/96
Real  net  -16  0  4.1  10.5  -3.4
return*  II  II
* only for affiliates who contributed from 5/94-9/96
Source: Superintendencia Bancaria
Old Age Benefits
The benefit entitlement in the Colombian pension system differs between the public and the
private system.  Workers still have the choice of switching systems before retirement if they find that
the public system offers a more attractive benefit than the private system.
In the private system, the official retirement age is 57 years for women and 62 years for men.
But  early  retirement  is possible as soon  as the balance  in the  individual account  is sufficient  to
finance  a  pension  of  at  least  110 percent  of the  minimum  wage.  Any  excess  capital  may  be
withdrawn  and  used  for purposes  other  than  retirement.  As mentioned  earlier,  affiliates whose
balance is sufficient to finance a minimum pension may also choose other investment plans for the
excess capital.  An affiliate retiring in the private system has essentially the same type of options as in
the Chilean pension  system: Upon retirement,  the worker can choose to convert  the accumulated
balance in the individual account plus the recognition bond to pension payments under a programmed
withdrawal program, use the amount to purchase an annuity from an insurance company, or opt for a
combination of the two.
2 These  figures  are not fully  consistent  with  the gross  rates of return published  by the Superintendencia
Bancaria.
34Pension benefits are tax-exempt up to  the limit of  20 minimum wages.  However, if  funds
accumulated  in the individual  account are used for any other,  non-retirement  purposes,  taxes are due.
In both the public and the private systems,  pensions are adjusted according  to the consumer  price
index.
Like in the other Latin American countries,  which have implemented  similar reforms, the
government guarantees the payment of a minimum  pension provided the worker has reached the
official  retirement  age and has contributed  at least 1150  weeks (22.12  years). The minimum  pension
amounts to  1 minimum  wage and currently amounts to approximately  US$ 170.  This amount is
roughly equivalent to 60 percent of the average wage.  The guarantee  entitles workers to draw a
monthly  amount  equal to the minimum  pension from their balance;  once  the balance  is exhausted,  the
government  takes over the benefit payments.
In the public system, the retirement  age is currently  still set at 55 years for women and 60
years for men. By the year 2014, it will be increased to 57 years for women and 62 years for men.
Originally,  it had been planned to raise the retirement  age to 60 and 65 years for women and men,
respectively,  over a period of 10  years, i.e. by the year 2004,  but this proposal was diluted during  the
negotiations  in Congress. Also, all new regulations  apply only to new entrants  to the labor force as
well as  female  and male affiliates,  who were 35 and 40 years, respectively,  at the moment of reform.
For older affiliates,  the previous (more  generous)  eligibility  conditions  and benefit formulae  are still
in force.
The pension of the public system now replaces between 65 and 85 percent of the average
income during the last 10 years before retirement  depending  on the amount of contributions  made.
The minimum contribution  period to receive a 65 percent replacement  rate is  1,000 weeks; the
replacement  rate is increased  by 2 percentage  points for every additional  50 weeks of contributions
up to 1,200 weeks and then by 3 percentage  points for every 50 weeks of contributions  between
1,200  and 1,400  weeks.
Although these replacement  rates are still high, they represent a substantial  reduction from
rates of up to 90 and even more than 100  percent for certain occupational  groups  before the reform.
Further, pension benefits were previously calculated on the basis of only the last 2 years before
retirement, which presented a strong incentive for strategic manipulation;  this provision has been
removed  for all affiliates.
In March 1997, there was only one old age pensioner receiving benefits from the new
system.
Disability and Survivors'  Benefits
The disability and survivors' benefit offered in the public and the private system are the
same. There are different  medical committees  to determine  disability  for public and private systems
but both are subject to the same set of rules issued by the government. A disability pensioner
receives benefits amounting  to 45 to 75 percent of the average salary, depending  on the individual
degree of disability and on the length of the contribution  period.  In order to receive a disability
pension, a worker must have contributed  for a minimum  of 26 weeks. A worker who has suffered
disability  resulting in a 50 percent loss of earnings capacity  and has contributed  for 500 weeks is
35entitled to a benefit of 45 percent of previous earnings.  For every 50 weeks of contribution between
500  and  800 weeks, the replacement  rate  is increased  by  an  additional  1.5 percent  of  earnings,
thereafter by  2 percent up  to maximum replacement rate of  75 percent.  Survivors'  benefits  are
within the same ranges but depend on the number of eligible survivors.
Affiliates of the private pension system are entitled to essentially the same benefits.  Like in
the other Latin American countries with private pension systems, the disability and survivors'  risk is
insured with private insurance companies.  The benefit is financed using the balance in the worker's
individual account plus the recognition bond, if any, topped up by a lump-sum to be provided by the
insurance  company.  Disability  pensioners  have  the  option  of  increasing  their benefits  through
voluntary top-up contributions.
In March  1997, there  were  79  disability  pensioners  and  841 beneficiaries  of  survivors'
benefits receiving payments from the private system.
Conclusions
- As in the case of Peru, the growth of the Colombian private pension system was limited
because  of the  co-existence  with the public  system. The competition  with  the public
system was not as "unfair" in terms of contribution rates and eligibility conditions as in
Peru but the  slow pace of reform in the public system and the disincentives  for older
workers to join the new system did present a significant obstacle to faster growth.
*  The ability of the private  pension system to generate long-term  savings  and mobilize
domestic resources has been limited by the low level of income in Colombia. More than
75 percent of the affiliates to the private system earn less than 2 minimum salaries.
*  The financial condition of the AFPs has been also been negatively  affected by the low
incomes of the  affiliated workers.  Since the  fees  are charged  as a  percentage  of the
salaries, the operating revenue of the AFP has also been low. So far, none of the AFPs
has broken even.
*  In spite  of using an existing fund management infrastructure, the  start-up costs  of the
private system were still very high. Expenses for advertising and marketing resulted  in
losses of almost 70 percent of the AFPs' capital compared to about 66 percent in Peru.
*  Although the financial sector in Colombia was far more  developed at the  moment of
reform, the diversification of the AFPs'  portfolios has been much slower than in Peru.
This  is mostly  due  to  high returns  on  fixed  income  securities  in  Colombia  and  low
trading on the stock market.
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